The upheaval caused by the development of digital media and networks has to do with the way property rights on intangibles are managed.
Ten years after challenging the traditional externality approach by linking them to the definition of property rights, he explored alternative conditions for exercising these rights based on the transaction costs entailed by these rights.
Negotiation costs are incurred by third parties as a result of the activities of economic agents. It is lower than the administrative costs of an agency aiming to evaluate it. A rule of ownership, the allocation of transferable usage rights, should be preferred.
Otherwise, a liability rule should be applied that provides compensation for loss of welfare caused by a third party.
Digital technologies have two types of impact on these costs:
• On the one hand, the costs of researching, negotiating and establishing contracts regarding the exchange of usage rights on intangible resources are reduced. Because it is possible to carry out these transactions online.
• On the other hand, the costs of enforcing property rights can be significantly reduced through techniques of encryption and access codes.
They make it possible to very precisely specify self-executing usage rights, as it is possible to program the terms of use of any digital directory.
Cyberspace is therefore among the users and creators of digital serials on the basis of welfare transfers by notary and judicial institutions.
It is more suited to a decentralized ownership regime of information use rights rather than a system that organizes the payment of compensation.
With reference to the transactional approach to property rights and the problems of institutions' inadequacy costs are taken into account. Second, it may not be adapted to the specific needs of users and users.
The high costs of measuring and enforcing property rights over information resources are significant. Traditional systems for managing these rights place a great deal of the burden of limiting and controlling them on creators and making them enforceable.
To carry out these processes more efficiently, various bodies are emerging for the collective management of these rights in different contexts: civil societies for copyright management, patent pools, etc.
The main disadvantage of these bulk plans is that they provide savings in transaction costs at the expense of incompatibility costs, i.e. the opportunity costs associated with poor adaptation of the exchange to the characteristics of transactions.
For example, there are copyright use licenses that allocate rights in bulk without taking into account the specifics of uses by the buyer or third parties.
The notable relevance of coding techniques is that they can be subject to transfer of defined usage rights for measurement and self-execution.
Typically, the problem created by servers is a rule that allows private copying. This is because it is hijacked by subscribers, leading to significant opportunity costs.
Losses resulting from the reproduction of a work and its small-scale communication control all private uses of sound recordings. Private copying is allowed as it is lower than the cost of the devices.
With the possibility of widespread distribution of private copies, this rule destabilizes the economics of music production.
On the other hand, the distribution of copies of each of the recipients of the recordings or digital copies may be prevented.
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On the contrary, decentralized negotiation combined with the features of digital technologies has an important interest. It is to allow a good adaptation of the nature of the rights conveyed to the characteristics of each transaction.
The methods and even the principles of state intervention in the IPR management system are therefore questioned by the new technological foundation.
ICTs enable personal protection of all digitized information. It also modifies the effectiveness of alternative forms of corporate control of intellectual property rights.
However, it would be wrong to argue that they override the traditional institutional framework.
First, it is necessary to ensure a certain transparency in the exchange and use of information, in order to allow inspection of the misuse of content by unauthorized third parties.
Indeed, no technical encryption system is completely inviolable. Control of uses is at least a system that records claims on information.
Therefore, it requires classification of intellectual property records, verification of legitimacy and absence of overlap between these claims and establishment of disclosure rules.
Organizations tasked with verifying potential usufruct violations can monitor how intangible resources are used.
For this reason, free software or virtual communities in particular share information over a very large-scale network. If necessary, bulk rules should be defined that force content owners to make them accessible or edit.
Dr.Yaşam Ayavefe
